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Rachel Cole, “Sixty Years Later: The Special Relationship between Germany and Israel” 
B.A. Honors Thesis in the Department of International Affairs at the University of 
Colorado at Boulder, March 2011 
 
This thesis examines the continuation of the special relationship between Germany and 
Israel in the 21st century. The relationship has existed for nearly 60 years yet current 
politicians played no role in the crimes of Nazi Germany and it seems logical that they 
would not share the same motivating factors as earlier generations.  In order to determine 
the future of the relationship, the paper begins by defining a special relationship within 
the field of international affairs. This focuses on motivations including shared interests, 
common values and ideals, historical intimacy or intensity as well as the influence of 
“soft” and “hard” factors on a relationship. Qualitative historical accounts are first used to 
provide background on the creation and growth of the Israeli-German special 
relationship. Having established that the relationship does in fact exist, comparative case 
studies are examined to highlight factors that could potentially change or end the special 
relationship. This includes data on rising levels of anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism across 
Germany and Europe, increasing differences between Germany and Israel on the 
appropriate use of force, and German politicians’ understanding of the special 
relationship within German identity and foreign policy. Having examined these 
influential factors, the power of “soft” factors in the continuation of the relationship is 
clear. German officials in the past have sacrificed strategic interests in favor of the 
alliance and have maintained the relationship with Israel as a vital piece of Germany’s 
identity and policy with no signs of alterations in the near future. The German public 
however, demonstrates increasing displeasure with continued associations to the nation’s 
Nazi past. More importantly, public opinion shows that Israel is increasingly viewed as 
committing crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing in the Occupied Territories, 
which has led to a decrease in support from the German people. Even with increasing 
German displeasure over Israeli use of force, the strength of the “soft” power of the 
Holocaust will allow the special relationship to continue into the 21st century.  
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Introduction 
The history of relations between Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany has 
been analyzed ever since the two states came into existence in the aftermath of the 
Second World War.  The attraction to the material is due to the intertwined history of 
both nations that is often still defined by the events that took place over 60 years ago. 
German attempts to eliminate the Jewish people, the subsequent fall of Nazi Germany 
and the establishment of the Jewish state in Israel are inescapable in defining the two 
nations’ relations. In the years following the end of the war and Israel’s establishment, 
relations between the states were defined by silence, with Germany paralyzed by guilt 
and “psychological denial.”1 Mutual acknowledgement came only with the 1952 
Luxembourg Reparations Agreement that signaled the beginning of an Israeli-German 
relationship and a mutual understanding that has lasted into the 21st century.  
This thesis will examine the uniqueness of relations between Germany and Israel 
while attempting to assess whether the relationship will continue through the 21st century. 
This will begin with the cautious approaches made by both sides in the aftermath of 
WWII to establish ties and move beyond the horrors of the Holocaust. The two nations 
have collaborated extensively on subjects ranging from science and technology to youth 
exchanges, which have contributed to the uniqueness and strength of the relationship. 
Having established that a special relationship does exist between the two, the paper will 
proceed to examine whether or not this special relationship will continue to shape 
relations between the two states in the future. The relationship deserves re-examination as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Lily Gardner Feldman, Special Relationship Between West Germany and Israel (New 
York: HarperCollins Publishers Ltd, 1984), 34. 
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Germany attempts to move beyond its moral obligation from the legacy of the Nazi era in 
order to embrace its 21st century identity. German unification since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union has created new circumstances within which Germany has begun to 
cautiously embrace its long dormant nationalism while reexamining the nation’s postwar 
policy of “never again war.”  In addition, public opinion regarding Jews and Israel has 
also begun to be dramatically altered. Israel is increasingly maligned throughout Europe. 
While Germany has not yet experienced incidents of anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism as 
dramatic as those of its neighboring European states, the growing trend appears to signal 
an end to the German public’s traditional support of Israel.  
The first step in determining whether Israel and Germany will continue to have a 
unique relationship within the field of international affairs will be to establish a 
functional definition of a “special relationship.” In order to fully understand what features 
are required, the literature review will begin with an examination of other examples of 
“special relationships” throughout international affairs. Such relations will include those 
between Germany and the United States as well as the United States’ relationship with 
the United Kingdom.  
Once a clear definition of a “special relationship” has been established, chapter 
two will proceed to examine the beginnings of the Israeli-German relationship. Originally 
defined by mutual silence, it took nearly a decade for the two states to begin 
acknowledgement. Examined will be the Reparations Agreement that finally brought the 
two states together for the first time, coupled with the opinions of the governments and 
peoples of both nations at this development. 
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The third chapter will examine moments that have tested the strength of the 
relationship. The majority of these derive from Germany’s attempts to balance relations 
with both Israel and the Arab world under the pressures of the Cold War. The painful 
legacy of the Holocaust came to the forefront with the discovery of German scientists 
working to develop Egyptian weapons, causing disbelief and anger in Israel. The capture 
and trial of Adolf Eichmann in Israel caused Germany to fear increased attention to the 
Nazi records of leading politicians, but in Israel the trial’s testimonies taught a new 
generation of Israelis the specific crimes of the Holocaust. These events pressured the 
relationship by emphasizing the negative history between both peoples; despite these 
challenges, the special relationship persisted.  
After examining the relationship’s ability to withstand diplomatic challenges, 
chapter four will focus on the different interactions and cooperation between Israel and 
Germany that have bolstered the relationship’s classification as “special.” This will 
include an examination of scientific cooperation harkening back to the era before the 
Nazi regime in which Jews and Germans were leaders together in the scientific field. 
Along with this analysis will be an examination of youth exchanges that exist between 
the two nations. Originally sponsored by the German government, the exchanges allow 
German and Israeli students to directly address the Holocaust and its effects on national 
identity in both cultures.  
With the background of German-Israeli interactions and policy thoroughly 
established, the paper will proceed to examine factors that could potentially bring about 
an end to the special relationship in assessing whether or not it will continue in the 21st 
century. Over 60 years have passed since the end of the Second World War, and today’s 
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future leaders are now three generations removed from the grief, shame, and loss that 
haunted both nations after the war. It would seem logical that modern leaders would not 
share the same priorities as their predecessors, having been raised in completely different 
societies and circumstances.   
The fifth chapter of this work will examine the consequences of the Second 
World War on the national identities of both Germany and Israel. For Germany, the 
violence and devastation of the war brought about an era of civilian power with military 
violence and strength becoming taboo subjects. Following unification however, German 
nationalism has begun to re-emerge. In addition, the nation has begun to re-assess its 
pledge of ‘never again’ war when faced with the continuation of ethnic cleansing and 
genocide worldwide.  For Israelis, the lessons of the Second World War and the 
Holocaust had nearly the opposite effect. In their determination to never suffer the 
prejudice and violence faced by their elders, Israeli culture became centered around the 
military and the use of preemptive force to protect its citizens.  
Another important factor in determining the future of the relationship is the two 
nations’ growing acceptance of one another especially in Jewish and Israeli opinions’ of 
Germany and more specifically, Berlin. Israelis are unwilling to forget the crimes of 
Germany but seem increasingly willing to accept Germany as they would any other 
nation. This acceptance includes Berlin as a top Israeli tourist destination along with an 
increasingly large permanent Israeli population within the city. Germany as a whole has 
experienced a revival of Jewish culture with the immigration of thousands of Soviet Jews 
after the fall of the Soviet Union. For these immigrant groups, the Holocaust does not 
serve as the community’s main association with Nazi Germany.  
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While the situation between Germans, Jews and Israelis has certainly changed in 
60 years, the German government’s policy toward Israel remains nearly unchanged from 
chancellor to chancellor. Chapter six will highlight the rhetoric and policy of the German 
government toward Israel and the Holocaust’s role within German national identity.  
Looking specifically at the Schröder and Merkel governments, there have been some 
differences in the presentation of German suffering during the war, but despite this small 
discrepancy, support of Israel has remained widespread in Germany’s ruling parties. 
The final factors to be examined in assessing the future of the relationship are the 
rising levels of anti-Semitism and anti-Israel sentiments in Germany and across Europe in 
general.  Israel is increasingly associated with the Nazi regime itself and faces growing 
criticism in Germany and greater Europe.  In addition to rising anti-Zionist sentiments, 
anti-Semitism continues to influence European opinion of both Jews and Israel. Often 
times, anti-Semitic attacks and incidents have been directly related to displeasure of 
Israeli policy and the ongoing Middle East conflict.  Increased displeasure of Israel and 
Jews as well as fatigue with the idea of German indebtedness for Holocaust crimes by the 
German public could dramatically shape and alter the motivations of German politicians.  
Having examined these factors, the thesis should reach a conclusion as to whether 
or not the special relationship between Israel and Germany will continue through the 21st 
century. In order to evaluate this question, research was conducted to create a 
comparative study across various fields all relating to the future of the special 
relationship. The examination of scientific cooperation as well as youth exchanges are 
highlighted to met the requirements of a special relationship as defined in the literature 
review. Existing research has analyzed anti-Semitism, the European policies toward the 
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Middle East conflict and Germany’s re-emerging nationalism, but little in the past decade 
has been dedicated to examining these trends as they relate to the relationship between 
Israel and Germany. Much maligned in the European media, Israel today faces 
unprecedented criticism across the continent. With Germany as Israel’s strongest ally in 
Europe, it must be questioned if a new generation of German voters will end the policies 
of their grandfathers moving instead to condemn Israel as their grandparents’ heir. If 
German public opinion of Israel is found to be moving in such a negative direction, one 
cannot help but wonder if the German government would defy the mandate of their 
people and continue the special relationship even as it directly counters the people’s 
desires. 
Methodology 
The purpose of this thesis is to assess whether or not the special relationship 
between Israel and Germany will continue through the 21st century. For sixty years, the 
relationship between the two has been defined by the events of WWII and its legacy. Yet, 
in sixty years, two generations have come of age having not lived during the war but 
experienced its ramifications decades on. This raises the question of how long foreign 
policy and national identity can be built on the experiences and actions of a generation 
that will soon no longer live to bear it.  It would seem logical that modern leaders do not 
share the same priorities as their predecessors, having been raised in completely different 
societies. This leads one to expect that the third generation would no longer share the 
same political alliances and priorities that shaped the majority of past policies. However, 
in the case of Germany and Israel, even as those who participated in and lived through 
the war are decreasing in number day after day, foreign policy still appears to be 
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determined by the events of the past. This thesis will attempt to uncover both political 
and public factors that could potentially change the nature of the relationship. As 
Germany has experienced more change that could alter the alliance, the majority of the 
factors examined are from Germany.  
 In order to thoroughly examine the history and future of the relationship, 
comparative case studies have been used spanning various fields. These studies include 
both “hard” and “soft” factors that are influential in defining the relationship. The 
historical review of the relationship in Chapter Two utilizes “hard” and “soft” factors that 
led to the establishment of the relationship. In Chapter Three, “hard” factors are 
responsible for Germany’s struggles to balance international diplomacy with the “soft” 
factors tying the nation to Israel. Chapters Two and Three both utilize qualitative, 
historical accounts to illustrate the early struggles in the creation of the relationship that 
helped to define it as special. The case studies used in Chapter Four focus for the most 
part on “soft” factors based on the shared values, memories and ideals between the Israeli 
and German people.  While the Israeli-German relationship has a long history of “hard” 
factors, including military cooperation and economic support, the use of “soft” factors 
allows for more insight into the interactions and opinions of the public rather than solely 
relying on the rhetoric and policy of governments. The later chapters of the thesis 
examine the continuing influence of “soft” factors on evolving “hard” factors that have 
the potential to influence the nature of the relationship.  Analyzing the relationship using 
a wide spectrum of qualitative sources allows for the work to not cover only one specific 
area within the relationship but instead draw from fields including history, diplomacy, 
military policy, and sociology. This allows the research to view and analyze the 
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relationship from a variety of perspectives, all which have the potential to alter the status 
quo.   
Sources covering both the Israeli and German perspectives have been used in an 
attempt to eliminate bias in favor of one country over the other. A large body of work 
already exists detailing the origins and beginning of the relationship. These secondary 
sources provide the basis of the paper. In examining factors that could alter the 
relationship, recent surveys and polls were examined in order to gain a better 
understanding of general opinion from both populations. Despite best efforts to examine 
the relationship and these factors from a wide perspective, there are expected limitations. 
Of these, the most influential is of course the language barrier. Official, primary 
documents from both Israel and Germany were therefore unobtainable. This also proved 
to be a challenge however, in examining secondary sources as much of the research done 
on the relationship has been conducted by German and Israeli scholars writing in their 
native tongues and therefore unusable when researching English-only documents. The 
University of Colorado also has limited or non-existent access to a variety of Israeli 
journals and books. With these limitations, it was not possible to acquire texts by scholars 
including Moshe Zimmermann that would have proved beneficial for the assessment.  
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Literature Review 
Chapter One: Defining “Special” 
 Relations between states are never completely equal; some alliances are stronger 
than typically expected and some rivalries are fiercer than others. Favors shift from one 
nation to another as political atmospheres change. Yet special relationships seem to 
represent a more solid and reliable alliance between states lasting even as political tides 
shift. The special relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States has 
been defined by one weakening state’s attempts to influence the policy of a growing 
power. Britain, with its own post-WWII global influence waning, realized that remaining 
close to, yet independent of, the United States would be the most effective way to serve 
British global interests. By using experience and knowledge, Britain was able, through its 
close relations with the United States, to guide American policymakers in favor of British 
interests.2 This relationship was further cultivated through the “enduring power and use 
of the symbols, memories and experiences associated with World War II [which were] 
initially direct and often personal.”3 Many similarities in the German-Israeli case may be 
observed, especially in the use of symbols and memory in a personal context. 
After examining the relationship between Germany and the United States, Hanz 
W. Gatzke noted three conditions required in order to create a special relationship 
between nations. The first seems the most apparent; the nations must share common 
interests, both political and economic. Secondly, nations must share a similar identity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 John Baylis and Steve Marsh, "The Anglo-American "Special Relationship": The 
Lazarus of International Relations," Diplomacy and Statecraft 17 (2006): 174.  
3 Ibid., 185.  
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regarding “basic aims, ideals, and values.”4 Lastly, between the two people, there must be 
“personal acquaintance and empathy” that is “firmly rooted in the past.”5 Like German-
Israeli relations, the relationship between the United States and Germany reached an 
absolute low by 1945 at the end of the war. Yet, despite the crimes of Germany and 
America’s role in bringing down the Third Reich, common interests due to the rise of the 
Cold War brought the two former adversaries into alliance once again. Common interests 
and mutual needs were also fundamental in the establishing the original relationship 
between Israel and Germany as will be further examined in Chapter Two.  
In looking specifically at the relationship between Israel and Germany, Lily 
Gardner Feldman presents her own view on the requirements for the establishment of a 
“special relationship” between nations. Feldman argues that special relationships are 
defined by both nations practicing “preferential treatment towards each other in more 
than one substantive policy area.”6 Nations cannot claim to have a special relationship 
that covers only one field; the relationship must span numerous fields. Feldman believes 
that “economic and defence seem to be essential” but at least one other policy area is 
required to support the case for special relations.7 These other policy issues can range 
from science and technology to cultural exchanges.8 In order to form a special 
relationship, Feldman’s definition requires historical relations spanning a long period or 
“an exceptionally intense history of mutual preoccupation.”9 These historical ties must 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Hans W. Gatzke, Germany and the United States: A "Special Relationship?" 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1980), 276. 
5 Ibid., 276.  
6 Feldman, 266. 
7 Ibid., 266. 
8 Ibid., 267-268. 
9 Ibid., 262.  
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then be shared by the peoples and governments of both nations. Both nations and peoples 
must have perceived needs that only the other nation can fulfill with no alternative 
partner.10 Overall, Feldman argues that special relationships in international relations can 
be classified through comparisons of “policy toward other individual countries” to the 
norm of policy in a specific area.11 Israel and Germany have without a doubt collaborated 
not only on economic and defense issues but also in optional fields that prove to 
strengthen relations between two states. The details of Germany and Israel’s special 
relationship will be further established in later chapters illustrating the different arenas in 
which the two nations share interests stemming from the historical intensity of the 
Holocaust. 
One of the most commonly cited examples of a special relationship is Israel’s 
with the United States. In analyzing the relationship between Israel and the United States, 
Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov argues that special relationships are defined by a combination of 
“soft” factors, common values and ideals, as well as “hard” factors, strategic interests.12 
While today the Israeli-U.S. alliance is cited as a primary example of a special 
relationship, it was originally much weaker as the United States was unwilling to 
compromise its strategic interests in the Middle East for the sake of Israel. It was the 
“soft” influences between the two states that often kept relations from reaching an 
irreparable rift.13 From Israel’s independence in 1948 to the Kennedy administration in 
1960, shared “soft” factors were still not enough to establish a special relationship 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Ibid., 262.  
11 Ibid., 266. 
12 Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, “The United States and Israel since 1948: A “Special 
Relationship”?,” Diplomatic History 22, No. 2 (1998): 232. 
13 Ibid., 233.   
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between the United States and Israel. Instead, for decades the United States viewed Israel 
as a political and strategic hindrance threatening ties between the United States and the 
Arab world. Eager to maintain relations with the Arab states and in doing so, prevent the 
further spread of Soviet influence, the United States often minimized the threats faced by 
Israel and refused to sell arms to the state.14  
With the Kennedy administration, the United States, recognizing Israel’s 
legitimate need for weapons when faced with Soviet-armed Arab states, and Israel 
developed a patron-client relationship. In return for U.S. weaponry, Israel practiced 
greater self-restraint against its Arab neighbors and halted nuclear developments. These 
policy changes did not occur because of increased understanding of the Israeli situation 
or the influence of American Jews but instead were initiated due to the decline of U.S.-
Arab relations and the United States’ attempts to balance Soviet power in the region.15 It 
was not until the 1967 war that American and Israeli interests met and signaled the 
beginning of the special relationship cited today. Even so, this relationship was fostered 
by “hard” factors, not “soft,” as the United States hoped a stronger relationship would 
allow it to persuade Israel to make greater concessions in order to resolve the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. During his presidency, Nixon stressed that increased American support was due 
to Israel’s role in balancing Soviet power and was not a result of the influence of 
American-Jewish support, a “soft” factor.16 
 It was only under the Reagan administration that today’s special relationship 
fully came into being with Israel receiving unparalleled strategic cooperation as well as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Ibid., 234-235.  
15 Ibid. 238.  
16 Ibid., 241-244.  
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dramatic increases in military and economic aid. Even with the establishment of a special 
relationship, the United States and Israel often disagreed on strategic decisions from the 
U.S. sale of radar systems and F-15s to Saudi Arabia, Israel’s 1982 war in Lebanon and 
the First Gulf War. 17 Although the relationship strengthened greatly under the Clinton 
and later Bush administrations, it has experienced much more turbulence than its Israeli-
German counterpart. Like the United States, Germany and Israel were forced to account 
for and balance the interests of “soft” and “hard” factors, but came to a much different 
conclusion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Ibid., 252-257.  
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Chapter Two: Moving Beyond the War 
Persecution of Jews is not a trait unique to a single European state, but for 
Germany above all others, the past continues to serve as a living piece of foreign policy. 
In the case of relations between Germany and Israel, it is impossible not to acknowledge 
the past and German attempts, from 1939 to 1945, to eliminate the Jewish people.  
Israel’s establishment in 1948, with the pain and memories of the Holocaust not even 
four years in the past, was far too soon to create any formal relations between Israel and 
the Federal Republic of Germany, created one year later. In these years silence was the 
only policy shared between the two nations as neither could find an acceptable starting 
point to address all that had come to pass. The German public remained paralyzed by 
guilt, and Jews and Israel refused to be the first to acknowledge a nation that had 
attempted to destroy them. In 1951, 47 nations ended their state of war with Germany and 
with this act, Israel began to break the silence. Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion 
argued that Germany had yet to renounce its activities throughout the war and had 
exhibited no public “change in heart” since the end of the war.18 By 1951 small German 
movements, including Erich Lüth’s “Peace with Israel,” began to call for an end to the 
silence on Germany’s part. Due to the influence of these smaller movements, Federal 
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer finally spoke on behalf of Germany, acknowledging the 
nation’s need to “bring about a solution of the material indemnity problem” and attempt 
to heal a small piece of the suffering caused by the German state.19  With this single 
declaration, Germany and Israel finally began the process of healing wounds and creating 
a formal relationship.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Feldman, 37.  
19 Ibid., 40.  
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It was through restitution and reparations that Germany and Israel first interacted 
with one another. While the states may have been speaking, there was no hiding the past 
in Israel’s approach to West Germany. By March 1951, the Israeli government appealed 
to the four great powers to seek restitution from Germany not only for property and 
wealth lost by those who endured and died in the Holocaust but also those who survived 
to immigrate to the newly established Jewish state as refugees. Israel’s letter to the 
Western powers spared no words or emotions in stating that although 
no indemnity can make good the destroyed human lives […] or pay for the 
tortures and suffering of the men women and children” and the crimes of Nazi 
Germany “cannot be atoned for by material reparation,” Germany could attempt 
to begin its relationship with the Jewish state through “payment of damages to the 
heirs of the victims and the reintegration of the survivors under the conditions of 
normal existence.20  
 
 Jewish refugees in Israel from Europe numbered approximately 500,000, and the total 
cost of absorbing the new immigrants was expected to be at least “$1.5 thousand 
million.”21 Israel’s economy was under severe stress from inflation and the entire country 
was strained enough to implement food rationing for its citizens.  Israel alone could not 
incur the costs of maintaining its economy and refugee population and thus looked to 
Germany as a source of capital to fight overwhelming inflation22. Israel argued that 
Germans, “responsible for this predicament” while still using and profiting from the 
property “taken from the Jews dead or alive,” should “be called up to help integrate the 
survivors.” 23  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Ibid., 42.  
21 Rolf Vogel, German Path to Israel, (Chester Springs: Dufour Editions, 1970), 31. 
22 Nicholas Balabkins, West German Reparations To Israel, (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Rutgers University Press, 1971), 97. 
23 Vogel, 31. 
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The Israeli demand for reparations and subsequent agreement in no way reflected 
a common consensus among its Jewish citizens. Both the far left and far right of the 
Israeli political spectrum opposed the negotiations and agreements, believing that any 
money from the German state would be blood money. Israel believed “Germany was an 
international pariah” and feared that direct talks would “erase the stigma of its moral 
untouchability.”24 Menachem Begin, the Polish-born leader of the Herut party and future 
prime minister, led the opposition arguing that direct talks with Germany were indeed 
worse than death and asked Israelis to consider what price they were willing to receive 
for “grandpa and grandma.”25 As Prime Minister Ben-Gurion appealed to the Knesset for 
approval of the negotiations, 1,000 demonstrators armed with stones attacked the Knesset 
building and battled police for over two hours.26 While the Israeli parliament did 
eventually accept the negotiations with Germany, the feelings of the Israeli public and 
political discord over the matter nearly drove the new state to civil war.  
In Germany the public welcomed the opportunity for negotiations with the Jewish 
state. Germany had no obligation under international law to compensate Israel and the 
Jewish people for the crimes committed under the Third Reich, but did so as a means to 
not only begin to move beyond its past, but also as a means to gain further international 
support and legitimacy.27 Speaking at Bergen-Belsen, West German President Heinrich 
Lübke noted that although “the burden of reparations is not in itself sufficient to relieve 
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[the] nation from its obligations,”28 the opinion of West Germany throughout the world 
would be raised greatly with voluntary German restitution.29 Press across the globe 
declared that German reparations would be the best action from the country “since before 
1933.”30 Many credit the United States as a force in pressuring Germany to make 
payments to Israel but in fact the United States was more concerned about Germany’s 
economic growth and ability to stand with the Western world in the Cold War. The 
United States feared that it would be forced to substitute the difference if Germany was 
unable to meet all of the reparation payments.31 For Germany, the reparations 
deliberations finally brought an end to the silence following the war and granted 
Germany its first step in moving beyond moral obligations from its National Socialist 
legacy.  
Ratified by Germany on March 20, 1953 and Israel on March 22, the Luxemburg 
Agreement stipulated the terms of reparations between the two states. The treaty 
consisted of four separate agreements each detailing Germany’s financial obligations to 
Israel. The first agreement, the Shilumim, committed Germany to pay three million 
Deutsche Marks to Israel. Protocol No. 1, the second agreement, was a pledge by the 
Adenauer government to initiate additional legislation allowing for the individual 
compensation of victims of the Nazi Regime. Protocol No. 2, the third agreement, 
stipulated that Germany would pay DM 450 million to the Claims Conference. This 
money was to be used for worldwide rehabilitation of Jews and other victims recovering 
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from damages done by Nazi Germany. The fourth agreement in the treaty called for Israel 
to refund Germany for secular property located in Israel, which most notably included 
possessions of the Knights Templar. In total, the treaty granted DM 3.45 billion to Israel 
from Germany. Of that sum, DM 450 million was to be transferred to the Claims 
Conference located in New York.32 Of the total amount, Germany was to pay one-third in 
foreign exchange while the other two-thirds were to be made up of goods.33 Germany’s 
first payment of DM 60 million was due to Israel the day the treaty came into force. From 
that point, an additional DM 140 million was due by March 31, 1953. Payment periods 
began on April 1st of every year and were estimated to last for twelve to fourteen years 
until the full sum had been paid.34 Yearly payments varied between DM 250 and 310 
million with Israel paying no interest on the sum. Realizing the original method of 
placing yearly orders with Germany was inefficient, additional protocols were 
implemented throughout the years.  
With this treaty, Germany and Israel took the first step in moving beyond the 
Holocaust’s legacy. The first years of the relationship were not necessarily easy as 
Germany attempted to navigate the Cold War world and Israel worked to create a new 
image of Germans away for those of the Third Reich. In examining situations that placed 
the most pressure on the relationship, Germany often wavered but always supported 
Israel in the end. 
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Chapter Three: Testing the Relationship 
The special nature of foreign relations between Germany and Israel can most 
clearly be found in Germany’s strained relations with the Arab states. More often than 
not, Germany has maintained strong relations with Israel at the cost of steady relations 
with Arab nations hostile to Israel. Germany’s balancing act is clear in the examination of 
two political issues that arose between Germany, Israel and various Arab nations: the 
question of diplomatic recognition and the case of German scientists working with the 
Egyptian government to create weapons.  
The issue of formal diplomatic relations was complicated by German attempts to 
maintain friendly relations with the Arab states and Israel simultaneously. Compared to 
other European powers, the Arab states had historically viewed Germany on much 
friendlier terms.  Positive German-Arab relations began with the alliance between Kaiser 
Wilhelm II and the Ottoman Empire in 1898. Part of this alliance included the building of 
a railroad line by German companies connecting Bosporus to Baghdad creating the “only 
traffic connection in the Middle East.”35 Even after Germany’s defeat in WWI and the 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire, positive associations between the two regions remained. 
With the outbreak of WWII, Arab states under the rule of European powers fought 
against Germany yet made it clear that their sympathies lay with the Nazi regime.  The 
fact that Hitler fought against France and Britain greatly allied the Arab people to the 
Nazi cause. Furthermore, with increasing hostilities toward Zionism and Jews in general, 
Arab leaders greatly favored Germany’s anti-Semitic policies. Even after the fall of the 
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Nazi regime, Germany continued to be associated with the Third Reich throughout the 
Middle East.36  
As Germany established relations with Israel and began negotiations on the 
Luxemburg Agreement, Arab criticism became increasingly prevalent. The Jordanian 
Prime Minister warned Adenauer that German ties with Israel would greatly threaten 
relations with the Arab states. The Syrian government echoed this warning that German 
restitution payments to Israel would have dire consequences to the state of German-Arab 
relations and threatened a blockade of all German imports.37 Despite the threats issued, 
the German government felt it had little reason to fear any severe repercussions in 
response to the Luxemburg Agreement. In order to prove Arab resolve, Saudi Arabia 
cancelled a $2 million order with the German company Siemens but reversed this 
decision only a short while later.38 Other Arab states voiced disapproval by cancelling 
meetings with German officials, but these decisions were often revoked in a short matter 
of time. These choices illustrated to the Germans that despite the threats, the Arab states 
were not as willing to allow the dissolution of relations, as they would have liked the 
Germans to believe.  Even after the ratification of the Luxemburg Agreement, the Arab 
states could not come to agreement on the implementation of an economic blockade and 
no action was taken against Germany.39 
While Arab protest was not enough to halt the Luxemburg Agreement, the Arab 
states were much more successful in halting the establishment of formal diplomatic 
relations between Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany. When negotiations of the 	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Reparations Agreement first began, Germany highly favored the establishment of formal 
diplomatic relations with Israel. Yet, the Israeli government, judging from the public 
protests that erupted in reaction to reparations, decided that full diplomatic relations 
would be too much for the Israeli public to accept.40  In 1955, Germany’s adoption of the 
Hallstein Doctrine dramatically complicated the issue of diplomatic relations with Israel.  
Developed in the context of the Cold War divide between East and West, the Hallstein 
Doctrine stated that the West German state would sever all ties with nations that granted 
full diplomatic recognition to East Germany.41  
With the Hallstein Doctrine, Arab leaders were able to exploit the division 
between the two Germanys as an opportunity to hinder German-Israeli relations. Egypt’s 
President Nasser was the first to announce that Germany’s establishment of relations with 
Israel would be viewed as a hostile act and Egypt would establish ties with East Germany 
in retaliation. These sentiments were soon echoed throughout the Arab world and if 
followed through, West Germany would have no choice but to end formal diplomatic ties 
with the majority of the Arab states. This time Arab threats were taken seriously by the 
West German government, which was not willing to risk Germany’s increasingly large 
trade with the region nor have the prospects of German unification weakened further with 
Arab recognition of East Germany.42   Despite multiple Israeli requests to begin talks to 
establish formal ties, West Germany continued to object in fear of Arab recognition of 
East Germany.  
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 With the issue of formal diplomatic relations still unresolved, the relationship 
between Germany and Israel was further strained with the discovery of German scientists 
working for the Egyptian government to develop arms. Following the Suez conflict, 
Nasser committed to better developing the nation’s arms in order to match Israeli 
weaponry.43 With goals of both domination of the Arab world and the destruction of 
Israel, the Egyptian government in 1958 began recruiting foreign scientists to improve 
Egypt’s weaponry. Israeli intelligence soon discovered that among these scientists were a 
group of Germans from a government-funded institute in Stuttgart. Without attracting 
public attention, the Israeli government protested to the German government, which 
responded by dismissing the scientists from the institute. Despite efforts to mollify the 
situation, many of the dismissed German scientists returned to Egypt on their own accord 
to continue their work.  
When Egypt launched two missiles against Israel on July 21, 1962, public 
attention was brought to the issue of German scientists working to further develop 
Egypt’s arms stockpile.  Israelis were distressed at Egypt’s acquirement of missiles 
capable of reaching their nation but throughout Israel, public outrage was directed most at 
the involvement of German scientists in creating weapons that could possibly destroy the 
Jewish state and from the Israeli perspective, finish the work of the Third Reich.44 From a 
purely political vantage point, the missiles were not a serious threat to Israel’s overall 
security with Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Abba Eban assuring that Egypt’s German 
scientists were only “second-rate [and] Israel’s progress [was], so far, greater than 	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theirs.”45 As Israeli anger grew over the issue, the German government maintained that it 
had no legal ground to prevent its citizens from traveling and working abroad.46  
Unsatisfied with the German government’s response and facing growing public 
displeasure at home, the Israeli government created its own policy to resolve the issue. 
Beginning in 1963, German scientists working in Egypt began to be attacked while in 
Europe. One escaped a shooting uninjured, while another disappeared; his body was 
never found. Another barely escaped an unexplained plane crash that killed his wife. 
Finally, in March 1963, when two men were arrested for threatening the daughter of 
another scientist, it became clear that the men were members of the Israeli secret service 
and the agency had been responsible for the attempted assassinations and disappearances. 
Prime Minister Ben-Gurion ordered an end to the secret service missions when they were 
made public. The violence caused anger amongst many members of Germany’s 
government and Ben-Gurion had invested too many years personally working to foster 
positive relations with Germany to allow the situation to cause permanent damage.47 
The Israeli government instead returned to diplomatic means in order to bring 
about an end to the work of the German scientists in Egypt. In May 1964, the Knesset 
passed a resolution stating that West Germany had a moral obligation to prevent German 
citizens from creating weapons whose goal was to kill Jews.48 West Germany once again 
cited its Basic Law guaranteeing German citizens the freedom of movement, which only 
allowed the government to take action against its citizens if a West German law was 
violated; as the scientists committed no crimes working for the Egyptians, the Germans 	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maintained that there was nothing they could legally do to stop their involvement.49 Once 
again, Cold War dynamics came into play, as Germany feared legal action against the 
German-Egyptian collaboration would allow Soviet scientists to fill the void and further 
encourage Egyptian diplomatic recognition of East Germany.  While Parliament 
members attempted and failed to introduce multiple amendments to the German 
constitution in order to deem the scientists’ work illegal,50 the German public echoed the 
disbelief of the Israeli press and public that fellow Germans might once again create 
weapons to murder Jews.51 In order to resolve the issue while maintaining relations with 
both Israel and Egypt and pacifying domestic and international criticism, the West 
German government quietly began recruiting the scientists with large monetary 
compensation to return to work in West Germany.52  
After resolving the issue of German scientists, attention turned once again to the 
issue of diplomatic recognition and the Holstein Doctrine. When news leaked in October 
1964 of German arms shipments to Israel, the Arab states once again threatened to 
recognize East Germany in retaliation. Nasser demanded that German shipments to Israel 
be halted immediately while Syria demanded that Germany commit DM 350 million for 
the construction of a dam. With Germany’s refusal of both demands, Nasser moved to 
recognize East Germany by inviting the Premier to Cairo. With this, Germany did in fact 
halt arms shipments to Israel, but still waited to invoke the Hallstein Doctrine warning 
Egypt instead that Germany would revoke all economic aid if the Premier’s visit was not 
cancelled.  Despite the warnings, the visit took place and was swiftly followed with an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Lavy, 67. 
50 Ibid., 68. 
51 von Hindenburg, 73. 
52 Lavy, 70. 
25	  
 
announcement that Egypt would establish a consulate-general in East Germany. After a 
brief stalement, the German government offered Israel full diplomatic recognition. With 
this act, ten of the thirteen members of the Arab League broke diplomatic relations with 
West Germany.53 After over a decade of attempting to balance relations between Israel 
and the Arab states, Germany was forced to finally commit to Israel from both moral 
obligation and Cold War realities. In the establishment of relations, German officials 
seemed to believe that their nation had done all that was required of it in moving beyond 
the legacy of the Holocaust, but for Israel, the establishment of official ties was seen only 
as a necessary step in the continuing special relationship.  
In the midst of the crises of diplomatic recognition and the German scientists, the 
Holocaust was once again brought to the forefront of discussion with the 1960 capture of 
Adolf Eichmann. Joining the Nazi Party in 1932, Eichmann would become a member of 
the S.S., the S.D. and the Gestapo. With the outbreak of the war, Eichmann headed the 
transfer of Jewish and Polish inhabitants from western Poland. In March 1941 Eichmann 
was nominated to head Office IV B4. Within the Gestapo, this office was responsible for 
“Jewish Affairs and Evacuation.”54 While attending the Wannsee conference, Eichmann 
served as the officer dealing with the question of the final solution of the Jewish problem. 
Those who directly carried out the mass murder of European Jewry did so under the 
regional and police departments of Eichmann’s office.55  
Having escaped an American internment camp in 1946, Eichmann eventually 
made his way to Argentina where he adopted the name Ricardo Klement working in a 
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Mercedes-Benz plant.56 It was in Buenos Aires, 15 years after the end of the war, that 
Mossad agents captured Eichmann on May 11, 1960 and smuggled him back to Israel. 
After confirming without a doubt that Ricardo Klement was in fact Adolf Eichmann, 
Ben-Gurion announced on May 23 the capture to a stunned Knesset. The announcement 
was made up of only two sentences stating that Eichmann was detained in Israel and 
would stand trial for the implementation of the ‘Final Solution’ that resulted in the deaths 
of six million Jews.57  The news shocked the entire nation serving as a source of pride but 
also forcing Israel to face the memories and painful experiences of Holocaust survivors 
who made up almost a quarter of the country’s population.58   
Surrounding the trial were questions of legality and jurisdiction, yet German 
concerns did not focus on Israel’s right to try Eichmann. As Eichmann had been 
kidnapped from Argentina, questions arose over the breach of Argentina’s sovereignty 
and Israel’s violation of international law. This argument was weakened by the fact that 
no extradition treaty existed between Argentina and Israel at the time, nor had Argentina 
granted Eichmann asylum.59 Despite the fact that this breach of sovereignty did not affect 
Jerusalem’s jurisdiction to try Eichmann, Argentina did submit a complaint to the U.N. 
Security Council. The issue was resolved with a Security Council resolution in which 
Argentina excused Israel’s violation and refrained from insisting on any type of 
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restitution.60  Issues also arose regarding Israel’s right under international law to try Nazi 
criminals. The crimes Eichmann stood accused of occurred before Israel was established 
as a state, took place outside Israel’s borders, and when the crimes were committed, the 
victims were not citizens of Israel.61 While the international community did find the legal 
precedents to support Israel’s trial of Eichmann, Germany made no official statements or 
disagreements on the trial.  
Instead, the German government’s main concerns focused on the fear that the trial 
would revive anti-German sentiments or bring the Nazi-tainted backgrounds of some 
officials to the public. Continuing the personal relationship that had formed between the 
two leaders, Adenauer personally contacted Ben-Gurion following Eichmann’s arrest to 
ask that the Prime Minister act to prevent the trial from inflaming anti-German 
sentiments.  In addition, Adenauer feared that the trial might bring further attention to the 
Nazi associations of Hans Globke. While Globke was a close advisor of Adenaur, his 
record was far from clear as he had worked for the interior ministry under the Third 
Reich and had “written one of the authoritative interpretations of the Nuremberg 
statutes.”62 Documents incriminating Globke were necessary for the case against 
Eichmann, but Ben-Gurion assured Adenaur that Chief Prosecutor Gideon Hausner 
would avoid drawing attention to Globke’s role in the documents.63 Throughout the trial, 
Ben-Gurion stressed the need to focus on the guilt of Hitler instead of the German people 
as a collective whole. Even with Eichmann as the defendant, Ben-Gurion instructed 
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Hausner to focus on Hitler as the “main and central factor […] and only then 
Eichmann.”64 
Both the German and Israeli public followed the trial closely bringing the issue of 
the Holocaust into discussions in both nations. In Germany, the trial was followed by up 
to 85% of the population through television and radio reports from Jerusalem. By the end 
of the trail, 85% of Germans polled agreed with the use of the death penalty on 
Eichmann. While they understood and supported Israel’s right to try Nazi criminals, the 
majority of Germans still felt personally detached from the Holocaust and its guilt. 53% 
of Germans polled wished to forget the crimes of the Third Reich and of those polled, 
only 8% felt “somehow implicated” in the crimes Eichmann was executed for.65  
The trial granted Israel an opportunity to re-examine its own understanding of the 
Holocaust. For Ben-Gurion, punishing Eichmann was not the trial’s most important role. 
The trial allowed the opportunity to remind the entire world that the “Holocaust obligated 
them to support the only Jewish state on earth.”66 In reiterating the crimes of the 
Holocaust, Ben-Gurion wished to also shame the Western powers for not doing more to 
save Europe’s Jews. More importantly, according to Ben-Gurion, the trial offered the 
chance to impart a more important lesson on the Israeli people. Ben-Gurion hoped the 
trial would teach the lessons of the Holocaust to younger generations of Israelis for whom 
the era had become much further removed.67  
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There is no doubt that prior to the Eichmann trial the memories and lessons of the 
Holocaust had been deeply internalized by the Israeli public. However, Israelis struggled, 
like most, to understand how six million Jews could have simply been murdered with 
what was perceived in Israel as no resistance. While Israelis saw themselves as the 
opposite of passive Diaspora Jews, the victims of the Holocaust came to represent the 
worst traits of exiled Jews in simply allowing themselves to be led “like sheep to the 
slaughter” by the Nazis.68  Unable to sympathize and comprehend the effect of the 
Holocaust on survivors, the Israeli public preferred that survivors silence their memories 
and instead focus on the future rather than dwell in the past. Survivors in Israel came to 
be represented by the image of a “tongue-tied […] eccentric, dumbstruck figure, living on 
the margins of society and often on the verge of insanity.”69 According to former Israeli 
minister Yossi Beilin, native-born Israelis of the 1950s associated Holocaust survivors as 
“sad people with numbers on their arms [or] insane people who wandered around with 
staring eyes.”70  
This classification of survivors at the margins of Israeli society was broken with 
Chief Prosecutor Hauser’s “parade of Holocaust witnesses.”71 The trial featured the 
testimonies of more than 100 survivors. The testimonies were broadcast across Israeli 
radio. For most, this was not only their first experience with the detailed crimes of the 
Nazi era but also the use of the radio brought survivors’ testimonies and pain into nearly 
every Israeli home. For the first time, survivors were invited to share their experiences 
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with the Israeli public.72 In hearing survivors’ accounts for the first time, the Israeli 
public was forced to change its opinions on the passiveness of the victims. Writing on the 
trial, Israeli poet and novelist Haim Gouri, speaking for the generation of Israelis who 
discounted the experiences of survivors, wrote, “We must ask forgiveness from [those] 
we so harshly judged [….] without asking ourselves what right we had to do so.”73  With 
the trial, a new respect for the “heroism of the weak” emerged in Israeli society bringing 
the crimes to the entire nation and further building Israel’s collective identification with 
the Holocaust.74  
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Chapter Four: “Special” Dealings 
As established in the literature, the formation of a “special relationship” in the 
field of international relations goes far deeper than simply foreign policy. The 
relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States demonstrates the need 
for shared memories and symbols; German-American relations stress not only political 
and economic interests, but also shared identity and empathy between the people of both 
nations, and according to Feldman, it must extend beyond one policy field. As with 
British-American and American-German special relations, the core of the German-Israeli 
relationship is rooted in the historical legacy of the Second World War. The special 
relationship between the two nations is perhaps illustrated most in the prominence of 
scientific cooperation and youth exchanges that involve interactions between citizens, not 
politicians of each nation. These exchanges reach far beyond the official rhetoric of 
support from both nations.  With them, Germans and Israelis are able to work and interact 
personally with one another providing the opportunity for each nationality to witness and 
experience the legacies of the Holocaust and Second World War in the other culture.  
Shared identity and empathy between Germans and Israelis has been fostered 
through both state-sponsored and independent scientific and youth exchanges. In 
promoting cooperation between scientists of each nation, Germans and Israelis not only 
contribute to the development of each nation but also pay tribute to the legacy of German 
and Jewish-German science that existed prior the rise of the Nazi Party. Until 1933, there 
existed a strong tradition between German and German-Jewish scientists with German-
Israeli scientific cooperation being seen as a return to a natural partnership.75 This 
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tradition is in fact partially responsible for the strength of Israeli scientific institutions and 
scientists. The first waves of scientists to arrive in Israel were Zionists educated in 
German universities and institutes. These scientists were instrumental in the growth and 
development of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Increasingly after 1933, Israel 
became a refuge for German-Jewish scientists fleeing Nazi persecution.76  
With the strong historical basis of German-Jewish scientific cooperation, 
exchanges between the two nations began in the 1960s. Israel’s Weizmann Institute and 
Germany’s Minerva Foundation were instrumental in creating bonds between the two 
nations. Beginning in 1960, the German government granted DM 3 million to the 
Weizmann Institute, which was followed with a formal contract between the institutes in 
1964. Between 1963 and 1972, the Minerva Foundation contributed over DM 37 million 
to fund basic research at the Weizmann Institute and sponsored a DM 70 million 
partnership between both institutions’ scientists. The Minerva Foundation distributes 
funds to projects chosen by a group of 30 Germans and Israelis. Originally, the 
Volkswagen Foundation sponsored Minerva’s student exchanges in Israel until 1973 
when the Ministry of Research and Technology took responsibility. With this, the 
German government increased its annual contribution to DM 1 million per year while 
Volkswagen continued to sponsor its own research programs in Israel.77  
In both Israel and Germany, scientific cooperation between the two nations has 
been noted for its uniqueness. The German chairman of the Minerva Committee 
commented that cooperation between Germany and Israel is of “higher learning than 
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Germany enjoys with most [of its] Western European neighbors.”78 Germany has 
contributed DM 13-14 million annually to scientific programs with Israel, an amount far 
greater than any of its contributions to other nations’ programs. For Israel as well, 
cooperation with Germany is much stronger than with other states. Some have estimated 
that without German cooperation, the Weizmann Institute’s budget would have collapsed. 
Comparatively, the United States in the 1970s only contributed $2 million per year to 
Israel, almost two-thirds less than Germany’s contributions in the same period.79 In 
restoring a tradition destroyed by the Nazis, both Germany and Israel have been leaders 
in the scientific and technological fields. 
 Along with scientific cooperation, the uniqueness of the German-Israeli 
relationship in terms of public interaction is perhaps best displayed in the long-
established youth exchanges. While similar to scientific cooperation, youth exchanges 
explicitly work to overcome the misconceptions present in both nationalities fostering 
understanding between Israeli and German youths. Occurring when most participants are 
teenagers, these programs offer the opportunity to positively shape perceptions at a time 
when most are creating and solidifying their opinions of politics and world order. 
Originally sponsored through government funds, these programs have become formative 
experiences for thousands of Israeli and German youths.  
 That Germany has an exchange program with Israel is not unique; the nation has 
programs throughout Europe and the globe. What is unique is the prominence of the 
Israeli exchange programs above all other programs. From the earliest years of youth 
exchanges, German interest was far greater than Israeli. In 1961, the Knesset approved 	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visits by German students to Israel in order to broadcast the great strides and 
achievements the state had made in little over a decade since its establishment.  While 
German students visited Israel, the Israeli government initially had no interest in sending 
Israeli youths to Germany in return. While bilateral cooperation on youth exchanges 
began in 1969, it was not until 1971 that the Israeli government took an active role and 
responsibility in sponsoring youth exchanges.80 In 1974, the German-Israeli Mixed 
Commission met to create regulations for the program determining aims, desired 
participants, and financial and administrative responsibility.81 
 When compared to other German exchange programs, the foundations of the 
program with Israel appear rather different. In establishing exchanges with other nations, 
a formal cultural agreement is implemented between both nations, but in the case of 
Israel, this agreement was never put into place. As opposed to being headed by a senior 
civil servant as usual, the head of the German Department of Youth personally directed 
the program until 1979. The program with Israel receives the same amount of funding 
from the German government as other programs but in addition, the Israeli program is 
granted an additional DM 500,000 annually.  From 1970-78, the Israeli program received 
15.3% of total German funding for all youth exchanges greatly exceeding the percentage 
of German students participating in the program.82 The German government has born the 
majority of costs associated with the Israeli exchange program, going so far as to pay for 
participants’ travel costs, a burden not handled for exchanges with any other nation. By 
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1975, 70% of all Israeli exchanges with non-Jewish groups were with Germany.83 For 
Germany, the exchange program with Israel is considered the most important receiving 
the government’s full support. 
 As a definitive piece in German-Israeli special relations, youth programs are 
considered one of the best means to heal and overcome the legacies of the Holocaust in 
both nations’ youths. Through these exchanges, it is clear how each culture has adapted 
the legacy within national identity. One dimension that arises within exchanges dealing 
explicitly with the Holocaust is the reversal of historic roles between Jews and Germans. 
Martin Schellenberg, an educational director and researcher at Bergen-Belsen 
concentration camp, noted that in youth exchanges, Israelis tend to hold the majority of 
power in the relationship between the two groups. German students are most concerned 
with Israeli opinions of Germans and whether or not the Israeli students have family 
members who died or survived the Holocaust. When visiting locations of Nazi atrocities, 
many German students feel the need to express feelings of guilt to their Israeli 
counterparts. Seeing guilt still harbored by Germans born decades after the Nazi era, 
Israeli students often move to comfort their visibly upset counterparts. In doing so, 
Schellenberg argues that the Israeli students hold the power of forgiveness for Germans 
and with this, control overall the levels of acceptance between the two groups.84  
Despite German feelings of guilt that often emerge in addressing the Holocaust, 
Germans for the most part disagree with the concept of collective identity while Israeli 
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students often group themselves as one entity no matter their own family connections to 
the Holocaust. Researchers Nirit Bialer and Tanja Kersting found that among German 
students there are decisive attempts to avoid identifying as a collective group. Since the 
end of the Second World War, there have been few, if any, attempts by the German 
people or government to create a German identity as nationalism and extreme collective 
identity are taught as definitive traits of the Third Reich. Instead, Germans tend to 
categorize themselves generationally. This allows German students to differentiate 
themselves and clearly oppose the ideology of their grandparents’ generation. Taking the 
opposite approach, Israeli students discuss the Holocaust and identification as citizens of 
Israel and a collective group. While Israelis told their own personal experiences with the 
legacies of the Holocaust, they more importantly together represented the “victim side” 
of German history. In Israel, the Holocaust is far more present in the creation of national 
identity with the entire nation commemorating the victims of Nazi violence on Yom 
HaShoah whether or not their own relatives suffered during WWII. The Israeli 
educational system and military service also greatly encourage a collective identity to 
which nearly all Israelis identify themselves as a part of. 85  
German and Israeli students learn and identify with the Nazi era and Holocaust 
from opposite perspectives and as expected, differences arise between the two when 
addressing the legacy in each culture. These educational exchanges allow Israeli and 
German students to face the past and understand the complexities of one another’s 
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cultures together, helping to ease some of these differences. In creating bonds that extend 
from personal interactions, both groups are able to create perceptions based on reality 
rather than history.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38	  
 
Chapter Five: Changes to National Identity 
It is arguable that of all the nations whose people fought and died in WWII, it was 
the societies of Germany and Israel which were most influenced by the war’s events. 
Both people embraced the concept of ‘never again’ but have taken opposite lessons from 
its meaning. By the end of the war, German attitudes on military violence had been 
completely altered from where they stood during the rise of the Nazi party. Unique 
among Western powers, Germany’s great trauma caused the nation to completely 
abandon warfare as a means of political influence. The “horrors of the Nazi Era” created 
a “stable anti-militarist political culture” in which Germany completely abandoned the 
nation’s previous military ambitions.86 Instead of relying on the influence of the military, 
Germany instead became a complete civilian power. With this new ideology, the German 
government’s civilian policy included: 
1.  Constraining the use of force in settling political conflicts […] 2. 
Strengthening the rule of law through the development of international regimes 
and international organizations […] 3. Promoting participatory forms of decision-
making both within and between states 4. Promoting non-violent forms of conflict 
management and conflict resolution 5. Promoting social equity and sustainable 
development to enhance the legitimacy of international order and 6. Promoting 
interdependence and division of labour.87 
 
This new political outlook meant that the state worked closely with its Western allies in 
“multilateral institutions and the UN.”88 Germany’s political mantra became “never 
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again, never alone, and politics before force.”89 Germany’s deviations from the traditional 
use of force allowed Germans to view themselves once again as exceptional and 
“distinctly different” from their Western neighbors, creating a new model of political 
development committed to German multilateralism and the restriction of violence to self-
defense.90  
 As well as losing military ambitions, Germany’s defeat also brought about an 
apparent end to visible German nationalism. After 1945, any efforts to bind Germans 
around a common identity were abandoned as all images led back to the National 
Socialist era and the shame of the nation’s past. The rise of European integration in the 
aftermath of the war allowed Germany to adopt a new overarching identity. By 
identifying with Europe instead, Germans were able to escape the burden of the Nazi 
crimes on their national character.91  
Following unification, Germany’s foreign policy made dramatic strides in moving 
past the nation’s WWII legacy. Most importantly, Germany has begun a process of 
remilitarization. While Germany participated only financially in the first Gulf War, the 
conflict in Kosovo created a situation in which Germany could no longer simply 
observe.92 In the years following the Gulf War, the Kohl government cautiously engaged 
in operations to slowly gain the support of the German public in favor of out-of-area 
missions. The most significant of these operations was the participation in strikes over 
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Bosnia. Previously German troops had only served as peacekeepers abroad, but as 
knowledge of ethnic cleansing and Serbian crimes came to light, Germany was forced to 
debate once again the meaning of ‘never again.’ In the past, the phrase had signaled that 
German troops would only fight in self-defense, never to engage in foreign conflict. Yet, 
as Serbian violence against civilians became more pronounced, Germans came to the 
conclusion that ‘never again war’ must also include a clause for ‘never again Auschwitz.’ 
Germans felt they had a moral responsibility to prevent another people from suffering a 
fate similar to the victims of German WWII violence. When confronted with the 
possibility of genocide and crimes against humanity, Germany was prepared to use force 
in combat in order to be on the “right side of history” in this case.93 The German left, 
which had been the strongest opponent against the use of force, was forced to reexamine 
its position and eventually came to the conclusion that Germany was morally obligated 
and justified to participate in a humanitarian intervention.94 
 Many German policy makers saw this return to the use of force as the beginning 
of ‘normalization’ for the nation. The success of post-Soviet unification brought about for 
the first time in 50 years a positive image of Germany. Germans felt that they had finally 
achieved their long time goal; “never before in history had Germany been at peace with 
its neighbours, united, democratic and free [… After decades] Germany had found its 
place in Europe.”95 Germans felt they were finally moving beyond their WWII legacy 
and “coming of age, becoming more self-confident and assertive.”96 
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 Israelis Jews experienced the same war as the Germans but on the opposite side of 
history as the victims.  Once again, the mantra of ‘never again’ was adopted but with a 
completely different meaning. Israelis were determined to ‘never again’ suffer the horrors 
their parents and grandparents faced, a lesson that was engrained in the Israeli psyche 
even before independence. From the beginnings of the Israeli Defense Forces in the 
Haganah and Palmach, WWII brought a sense of fatality to military strategy that has yet 
to be abandoned. Although allied and fighting along side the British, Jews feared “being 
abandoned by the Allies “to be surrounded by Germany and the Arab world facing almost 
certain death.97 If the war had progressed to that point, the Jews of pre-state Palestine 
were determined to fight until the end rather than be led to the gas chambers. As the 
ideology of the IDF developed further, soldiers became “Giborei Israel – the heroes of 
Israel” looking for inspiration in the legendary fighters of Masada and the Warsaw 
Ghetto willing to defend the Jewish people till death.98 This principle only grew stronger 
as Israelis assessed their own precarious situation in the years after independence. The 
Holocaust was paramount in shaping the warrior spirit, as the young nation struggled to 
understand the systematic murder of six million Jews and the continuation of widespread 
anti-Semitism. Especially in Israel, there was a sense that no matter how far Jews fled or 
assimilated, it would never be enough to appease hatred against Jews. Military might 
therefore came to be seen as the only means of protection against global anti-Semitism.99 
In addition to internalizing the Holocaust, Israel after independence was a state 
surrounded by hostile nations.  Israelis perceived themselves to be “a small island in an 	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Arab sea” and despite advantages in technology and weaponry, felt completely 
outnumbered against an enemy intent on their destruction.100 Together the threat of Arab 
violence and consequences of the Holocaust created a mentality of “Ein Breira,” 
translated as “no choice or alternative,” reflecting the overwhelming belief that the only 
obstacle between Israel and destruction was the IDF.101 
The idea of no other option has taken a leading role in shaping the IDF’s strategy.    
Most importantly, the IDF is characterized by “an extremely effective and overtly 
aggressive military” serving as a deterrent against the nation’s hostile neighbors.102 Due 
to Israel’s reality as a small, narrow nation, “it became imperative that Israel always 
attack first.”103  With military violence deemed an unavoidable necessity for continued 
survival, the idea of no other alternative grants the IDF a type of moral justification for 
violence. This can be seen even in the name of the army - defense forces – as opposed to 
offense.104 The IDF views itself as only resorting to self-defense when forced to by an 
enemy; hatred for an enemy does not serve as the impetus for war.105 In addition, the 
original ideology of the IDF prided itself on a “purity of arms.” This doctrine called for 
the “restricted and cautious use of arms [while] preserving humanistic norms in combat, 
refraining from unnecessary bloodshed, and avoiding, at all cost, harming civilians in 
general.”106 These morals were meant to not only preserve Western ethics but to also 
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prevent bitterness and personal hatred toward Israelis from their Arab neighbors allowing 
for the possibility of peaceful relations in the future.107 In actual warfare, however, these 
idealistic morals have proven continually challenging to uphold and many would argue 
they have been violated in the wake of the 1982 Lebanon War, intifadas, and military 
operations in Gaza and Lebanon. 
With military force aimed at preventing the destruction of Israel, times of war 
have often brought forward feelings of unavoidable danger and fear. These feelings only 
increased in the Israeli psyche after the June 1967 Six Day War. Once again, Israel felt it 
was at the brink of extinction. In Tel Aviv, parks were prepared to create mass graves for 
the tens of thousands expected to die with one official expecting “to dig graves for forty 
thousand.”108 For many Israelis, it brought back the feeling of being unable to escape 
death that had been felt under the Third Reich.109 War after war with Arab neighbors has 
left Israelis believing that genuine peace will never follow.110 Israel has been left to face 
terrorist violence with military power and today is repeatedly condemned by world 
opinion for excessive violence. Despite international criticism, the lessons of history have 
taught Israelis that military self-defense is the only means with which they can fulfill the 
pledge of ‘never again.’ 
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Chapter Six: Acceptance of One Another 
There is no question that the Holocaust will never be forgotten; it is a simple fact 
that history will always remember the actions of Nazi Germany. Even today, 51% of 
Israeli Jews disagree with the question, “Is it time to forgive the German people and 
Germany for crimes committed in the Holocaust,” another 19% disagree somewhat and 
only 23% are willing to forgive the Holocaust.111 Yet, Israelis and Jews in general are 
beginning to look beyond Germany’s Nazi past and in fact seem to favor the nation in 
various cases. Since the 1970s, Israeli opinion of Germany has steadily become more 
positive and in general, the Israeli public tends to hold more supportive views of 
Germany than Israeli politicians or media.112 Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
while Israeli politicians and media spoke of the dangers and possible return of Nazism to 
a united Germany, the Israeli public was increasingly in favor of reunification. In a 
March 1990 poll, over “two-thirds of the Jewish Israelis interviewed […] raised no 
objections to the unification of Germany” with the younger generation of Israelis 
expressing even fewer doubts.113 Even when asked to respond as a diplomatic 
representative of Israel to the question, “Must Israel be for or against German 
unification?” polls showed that only 21% of respondents were opposed to unification.114 
When specifically asked about the ramifications of German unification to Jews, 34% 
responded that unification possessed a threat to Jews while 49% disagreed and 17% 
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“didn’t know” if united Germany would be a danger to the Jewish people.115 At the time 
of unification, 40 years after the Holocaust, Israeli public opinion reflected the 
acceptance of a new Germany beyond associations with the Nazi past.  
This increasingly positive association with Germany can clearly be found in 
tourism trends for both nations. Beginning in the late 1960s, Germans and Israelis 
increasingly visited one another’s nations. From 1965 to 1966, German tourism to Israel 
increased by 15% with 13,500 Germans visiting Israel in 1966. In 1965 alone, German 
youths spent 9,635 nights in Israeli hostels, and the next year the list of Israeli hostels was 
published in German.116 From 1975 to 1977, German tourism to Israel more than doubled 
with 110,000 Germans visiting in 1977.  Tourism trends to Israel appear to correspond 
with the political environment. Tourists numbers in general dropped dramatically with 
outbreaks of violence such as the 1982 Lebanon War and the First Intifada but in the 
specific case of German tourism, numbers also depend on the strength of the special 
relationship at the time. As Germans have become more confident in their position as a 
leading European nation moving beyond the legacy of the Holocaust, German tourism to 
Israel increased. Yet with Prime Minister Menachem Begin’s 1981 tirade against German 
Chancellor Schmidt and the German people for their indifference and compliance with 
the Nazi regime, German tourism to Israel fell dramatically the following years. Even 
when coupled with the influence of the 1982 Lebanon War, the decrease in German 
tourism is still far greater than those of other Western European nations. Germans were 
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unwilling to travel to Israel due specifically to the decline in bilateral relations.  It took 
until 1987 for the number of German tourists visiting Israel to return to the 1981 level.117 
While German tourism to Israel is illustrative of the strength or weakness of the 
relationship, Israeli tourism is a clear indicator of the public’s willingness to treat 
Germany as any other nation. Beginning in the 1960s, Israeli tourism to Germany began 
to dramatically increase. Traveling throughout Germany in 1965, Israeli youths spent 
26,666 nights in German hostels.118 Germany has continued through the decades to be a 
leading destination for Israeli tourists. Even in 1983 with the Begin government clearly 
vilifying Germany as a whole, 131,000 Israelis traveled to the nation. These numbers are 
remarkable as Israel at the time was financially strained and any travel abroad was a huge 
financial commitment.119 Today Israelis represent the second largest number of non-
Europeans to visit Berlin behind Americans. The director of public relations for Berlin 
Tourism Marketing reported that in the first half of 2010, Israeli vacations to Berlin 
increased by almost 25% with 22,531 Israelis visiting.120  
 Along with a thriving supply of Israeli tourists, Berlin has also welcomed large 
numbers of Israeli immigrants. While exact numbers are uncertain, estimates place 9,000 
to 15,000 Israelis in Berlin. For many older Israelis, immigration to Germany was seen as 
a betrayal and even today the location remains taboo. Growing numbers of young Israelis 
are attracted to Berlin as a modern, fast-paced cultural capital in the heart of Europe. 
Many come for work, education and artistic opportunities that are unavailable in Israel.  	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Berlin is attractive due to the “freedom and space” as well as a more “tranquil […] 
relaxed spirit” that many feel Israel lacks.121 While the past may not define Germany for 
young Israeli émigrés, many are also drawn to the city in part by family ties. German 
immigration policy grants citizenship to Jews who fled under the Nazi Regime and 
extends this to their descendents as well.122 Many Israelis of German-Jewish descent 
claim that while growing up in Israel, they still feel somewhat German and identify with 
German culture. Often, Israelis living in Berlin speak of their families’ connections to the 
city citing grandparents’ accounts of happy childhood memories before the Nazis came to 
power and “abducted” the nation.123 Living in Berlin allows these Israelis the opportunity 
to visit their family’s past while also enhancing one’s sense of Jewish identity.  
Along with a growing Israeli presence in Berlin, Jewish communities across the 
nation are experiencing a population boom and cultural resurgence. At the end of the 
Second World War, approximately 6,500 Berlin Jews had survived and were joined by an 
additional 2,000 concentration camp survivors. Despite calls by international Jewish 
organizations to leave Germany, the Jewish community remained with many survivors 
viewing themselves as witnesses whose presence forced Germans to confront the nation’s 
past. As the bearers of this legacy, many German Jews did view themselves as simply 
biding their time in Germany, sending their children abroad through Jewish organizations 
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to prepare for their eventual departure from Germany. Yet even as later generations did 
move abroad, many returned to Germany as their home.124  
By 1989, Germany’s Jewish community still survived, but was facing huge 
demographic concerns. Although the total West German Jewish population numbered 
20,000 to 30,000, the majority were elderly citizens and the birthrate continually 
decreased. The situation was dramatically altered with the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and subsequent mass migration of Russian Jews to united Germany. 125 Under the 1991 
‘Contingency Refugee Act,’126 Germany “grants all Jews from the former Soviet Union 
citizenship and automatic government benefits.”127  It is worth noting that originally, 
Israel opposed Germany’s immigration policy toward Soviet Jews. Israelis argued that 
Soviet Jewry would be granted automatic citizenship in Israel and pressed Germany to 
make it more difficult for Soviet Jews to immigrate. For Germany, this demand was 
unreasonable, as it would allow immigration of Soviet refuges yet exclude Jews making it 
clearly discriminatory with allusions to Germany’s Nazi era.128 With this policy’s 
implementation, Soviet Jews flocked to Germany and in doing so saved German Jewry 
from population collapse. Over 190,000 Soviet Jews have immigrated to Germany since 
1989 and today make up 85% of Germany’s Jewish population. The official Jewish 
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Community in Germany has 108,000 members with 12,000 of those living in Berlin. 
Currently, Germany has become an even more popular destination for Soviet Jews than 
Israel and in 2002, received 19,262 admissions for citizenship while Israel received only 
18,878.129  
For these Soviet Jewish immigrants, the Holocaust does not serve as their primary 
point of reference toward Germany. Instead of the painful legacy of the Holocaust, Soviet 
Jewish identity was shaped by discrimination and prejudice at the hands of Stalin with 
memories of murder and exile to Siberia. From the Soviet perspective, German violence 
was directed not just at Jews but also against the entire Soviet nation. There have been 
many instances of Jewish Soviet émigrés in Germany proudly displaying badges earned 
while serving in the Red Army during WWII. By immigrating to Germany instead of 
Israel, Soviet Jews enter a financially strong nation whose culture and heritage are much 
more similar than Israel. Germany’s violent history against Jews is today a memory of 
the past and when faced with the images of suicide bombs and war in Israel, many Soviet 
Jews consider Germany to be a much safer destination.130  
 From this data, it would seem that when prompted, Jews and Israelis will 
categorize Germans by their Nazi crimes, but overall, there has been a normalization of 
relations between the Jewish and German people based on historical ties going beyond 
the Holocaust. For both nations, tourism allows the other an inside look at a nation that 
has been continually classified by the legacy of the Holocaust. As Germany’s Jewish 
population strengthens, its growth presents the opportunity for the Jewish present to 
perhaps eclipse the past violence against German Jews.  	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Chapter Seven: German and European Foreign Policy Toward Israel 
Although Germany has begun to re-embrace nationalism and its role as Europe’s 
leading nation, as of now there have been no serious attempts to alter policy toward 
Israel. The 1998-2005 Red-Green coalition led by Gerhard Schröder focused heavily on 
maintaining a “Holocaust-centered memory” in German policies, believing that the Nazi 
past and its crimes to be an undeniable piece of Germany’s national psyche. In the years 
following the Second World War, Germans publically ceased to celebrate their own 
national identity, and Schröder worked to promote a German identity once again while at 
the same time “acknowledging German historical responsibility.”131 The Schröder 
government was responsible for the completion of the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of 
Europe just a few blocks from the iconic symbols of Germany, the Reichstag and the 
Brandenburg Gate. Along with the controversial memorial, the Schröder government was 
also responsible for compensation to forced laborers under the Third Reich.  In fully 
acknowledging Germany’s historic legacy, Schröder encouraged nationalism stating that 
in accepting the past Germans would be “less inhibited” and feel “even more German.”132 
The Red-Green coalition worked against the rising trend to focus on the German victims 
of the Third Reich that occurred in the early 2000s.133  
Under the Schröder government, Israel’s needs and German responsibility to the 
nation remained paramount in German foreign policy. Schröder’s ambassador to Israel 
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stated that ensuring Israel’s survival is a vital piece of Germany’s “raison d’état.”134 
Chancellor Schröder echoed these sentiments stating that “Israel gets what it needs” from 
Germany in order to maintain its security.135 All five main German political parties 
“maintain a political foundation in Israel.”136 According to Green party member Joschka 
Fischer, Schröder’s Foreign Minister, the continuation of the special commitment to 
Israel is rooted in Germany’s “historical responsibility for the Holocaust [and is] non-
negotiable and cannot be qualified.”137  
Current Chancellor Angela Merkel has retained some of her predecessor’s 
policies on integrating Germany’s legacy into modern politics but differs significantly in 
stressesing German suffering during the war. Immediately after coming to power, 
Merkel’s coalition worked to institutionalize memorialization of the Third Reich’s 
German victims along with the more traditional victims of Nazi violence. With this, the 
German government proposed dedicating a site in Berlin to the victims of forced 
migration and expulsion. Merkel’s approach to dealing with Germany’s historical legacy 
is to accept Germany’s responsibility: 
without attempting to normalize the past, clear appreciation of German suffering 
[…] as a consequence of Nazi Germany [and] a link between the past, present and 
future in Germany’s historical responsibility on discourse and policy.138 
 
Despite the growing trend to recognize the German victims of the Third Reich, Merkel 
has successfully balanced the remembrance of Germans with Germany’s historical legacy 
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toward Jews and Israel. Like Schröder, the Merkel government maintains acceptance of 
the German past as a means to empower Germany in its modern political role. 
Merkel has kept the Nazi past as a key element in Germany’s policy toward 
Israel, stating that the relationship is “special and unique” with no plans to normalize 
relations in the near future. Foreign Secretary Frank Walter Steinmeier reiterated “with 
no other country [is Germany] linked so inseparably through our history.”139 Israel 
remains the only non-European state with which Germany holds joint cabinet meetings. 
For the 60th anniversary of Israel’s independence, Chancellor Merkel brought over half of 
the German cabinet to Israel for the ceremonies. This trip in March 2008 was Merkel’s 
third visit to Israel in two and a half years. During the trip, Merkel visited Yad Vashem 
Museum with Israeli President Shimon Peres and members of both governments 
representing the first time the nations had jointly commemorated the victims of the 
Holocaust. As the first German head of government to address the Knesset, Merkel 
stressed the uniqueness of the Holocaust and maintained that German-Israeli relations 
would continue to be special.140 Merkel also addressed the growing trend by the 
European public to view Israel as the largest world threat stressing that European 
governments must not “fearfully bow to public opinion” against Israel.141 Merkel has 
continually stressed the severity of Iran’s threats against Israel and denial of the 
Holocaust. She has reiterated on numerous occasions that supporting Israel in speeches is 
not enough and speeches must be reflected by actual deeds in support of Israel.142 
Economically, Germany is Israel’s second largest trading partner with 4.3 billion Euros 	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of bilateral trade in 2007.143 Support of Israel has become an inescapable piece of 
German foreign policy in the nation’s mainstream political parties. The rhetoric of the 
German leaders would suggest that Germany will not normalize the relationship in the 
near future, nor does it have the ability to as the relationship forms a vital piece of 
Germany’s reason of state.  
Beginning with Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian Territories following the 
1967 Six Days War and continuing with the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, European views 
of Israel changed dramatically. Israelis became seen as colonizers, with the Palestinians 
inheriting the previous Jewish role as the victims of racism and oppression.144 Israel and 
Europe have maintained differing views on the most important factors in establishing 
peace between Israelis and Palestinians. Throughout the 1970s, Israel took continued 
offense to Europe’s argument that Palestinian rights were at the center of the conflict, the 
idea of a Palestinian homeland, and Europe’s insistence that a comprehensive agreement 
would solve the conflict better than Israel’s preferred bilateral negotiations.145 On June 
13, 1980, the European Council released its most comprehensive resolution on the Arab-
Israeli conflict, the Venice Declaration. Israel was highly critical of the Declaration 
including Europe’s insistence at the participation of the PLO in negotiations. Israel once 
again argued that Europe had no understanding of Israeli security concerns.146  France has 
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played a leading role in determining the direction of European opinion toward Israel and 
has, in general, led European diplomatic and economic support of the Palestinian 
Authority.147 French disapproval of Israel continued with the 2008 Operation Cast Lead 
by Israel against Gaza with the French government heavily criticizing Israel’s actions. 
These sentiments were not, however, echoed by all of Europe with the Czech president 
and Italy classifying the operation as a defensive action provoked by Hamas while the 
U.K. attempted to establish a ceasefire through diplomatic means.148  
Within the European sphere, Germany’s support for Israel has been demonstrated 
in its neutrality during European criticism of Israel. As early as 1971 with the Schuman 
Paper, Germany has worked to prevent the publication of EU documents favoring the 
Arab cause.149 Although the published Venice Declaration was unfavorable toward Israel, 
there are claims that Germany prevented an earlier draft from being endorsed, as it was 
even more critical of the Israelis.150 Germany has often used its own strong relations with 
Israel to bridge the distrust and distance between Europe and Israel. With this, Germany 
has been able to lead peace initiatives on behalf of the EU that otherwise would have 
been more difficult to implement.151 Although Germany has on a small number of 
occasions used the European Union as a means to criticize Israel, more often than not, 
Germany has been Israel’s most ardent supporter on the continent. The power of Europe 
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in influencing the Middle East conflict has been inconsequential and a uniform policy has 
yet to be agreed upon by the European powers.152 
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Chapter Eight: Rising anti-Semitism across Germany and the European Continent 
Acutely aware of the consequences of historical anti-Semitism, Germany and 
Europe as a whole have struggled to differentiate between criticism of Israel and 
traditional anti-Semitism.  The European continent has been much more critical of Israeli 
policy but these sentiments have also become attached to European Jewish communities 
as well. For the majority of Europe, Israel has become an international pariah often 
compared to some of history’s worst regimes. Negative European perceptions of Israel 
began in the aftermath of the 1982 Lebanon invasion coupled with the Sabra and Shatila 
massacres carried out by Christian Lebanese fighters. From that point, the European left 
began to view Palestinians as the victims of racism and oppression by Israel.153 The 
majority of Europeans possess an “abiding suspicion of the Jewish state [with] very little 
empathy for the Israeli situation.”154 Disregarding Israeli security concerns, European 
diplomats often argue privately that “Israel should make more concessions”155 with 
members of the Nobel Prize committee expressing the desire to recall Shimon Peres’ 
prize but not that of his Palestinian counterpart, Yassar Arafat.156 Of 7,515 EU citizens 
polled in October 2003, 59% said that yes, Israel was a threat to world peace, ranking the 
nation first ahead of others such as Iran, China and Russia.157 35% of Europeans believe 
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that the IDF intentionally targets Palestinian civilians with Israeli responses to terrorism 
being considered “excessive.”158  
Becoming increasingly prevalent throughout Europe is the association of the 
current Israeli state with Nazi Germany and apartheid South Africa. When asked, 35% of 
European respondents answered that modern Israel is similar to apartheid South Africa. 
In 2005, the Executive Council of Britain’s Association of University Teachers voted in 
favor of boycotting two Israeli universities, Bar Ilan and Haifa, with the objective to “end 
Israel’s occupation, colonization and system of apartheid” in the occupied West Bank.159 
Leading European authors have been especially taken with this comparison. Louis de 
Bernières wrote, “Israel has adopted tactics which are reminiscent of the Nazis” while 
Irvine Welsh stated that “Israelis were educated by the Nazis and the Palestinians 
suffer.”160 Continuing these sentiments, Benjamin Zaphaniah claimed that the Israeli 
occupation of Palestinian lands was “genocide” and Portuguese Nobel laureate José 
Saramago “compared Ramallah to Auschwitz.”161 Agreeing with these authors, many 
European media outlets have promoted the association between Israel and the Third 
Reich. British MP Oona King compared the Gaza Strip to the Warsaw Ghetto in an 
article in published in the United Kingdom’s The Guardian. In 2002, the Greek 
newspaper Ethnos featured a caricature depicting two Israeli soldiers looking for 
Palestinians to torment with one telling the other that Jews went to Auschwitz “to learn, 
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not to suffer.”162  The Austrian newspaper Kleine Zeitung in 2004 showcased a caricature 
of two pictures side by side. The first showed an SS soldier and a Jewish child with a 
burning background. This was a clear illusion to an iconic photo of a Jewish child and SS 
officer in the Warsaw Ghetto. The other half of the caricature featured the same setting 
but in this case, the soldier was now Israeli and the child was clearly Palestinian.163  
Between the European literary world and mass media, comparisons of Israel to the Nazi 
and apartheid regimes are becoming prevalent in influencing public opinion.  
Along with rising levels of anti-Israel sentiments, Europe has also experienced 
rising levels of anti-Semitism. The Anti-Defamation League’s annual report on European 
attitudes toward Jews illustrates how rampant anti-Semitic attitudes are across the 
continent. The 2009 report covered seven European states from Spain to Poland 
consisting of 35,000 telephone interviews. Across the continent it is widely believed that 
Jews are more loyal to Israel than their nation of residence with 64% of Spanish and 63% 
of Polish respondents agreeing this was “probably true.”164 Following the traditional anti-
Semitic stereotype connecting Jews and money, 67% of Hungarian, 56% of Spanish, and 
55% of Polish participants agreed it was “probably true Jews have too much power in the 
business world.”165 Out of all seven nations surveyed, over 40% of respondents believed 
this statement to be true. Correspondingly, 74% of Spanish, 59% of Hungarian, and 54% 
of Polish respondents believed that it was “probably true Jews have too much power in 
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international financial markets.”166 44% of all surveyed believed that “Jews still talk too 
much about […] the Holocaust” with the largest percentages occurring in Hungary 
(56%), Poland (55%) and Austria (55%).167 
A European nation’s history with anti-Semitism and the Holocaust directly affects 
current levels of modern anti-Semitism. Countries that lacked significant anti-Semitism 
prior to 1945, such as Scandinavia and the U.K., today have much higher levels of anti-
Semitism than nations with a historical tradition of anti-Semitism and experienced the 
Holocaust, including Germany, Poland and Ukraine.168 The former director of the 
European Monitoring Centre for Racism and Xenophobia stated “anti-Semitism is 
permanently present in Europe in a more or less hidden way.”169 Jewish communities 
throughout eight different European Union states have reported fearing for their safety 
with the chief Rabbi of the British Commonwealth, Jonathan Sacks, proclaiming that 
anti-Semitism today is “directed against Jews as a sovereign people.”170  
Across Europe, increasing levels of anti-Semitism have corresponded with rising 
levels of violence against Jews. In Belgium, with a Jewish population of 40,000, children 
attending Jewish schools are frequently harassed and receive police protection. Within 
one week in 2004, Antwerp reported six anti-Semitic attacks that included the stabbing of 	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a 16-year old Jew, the attempted shooting of three Jewish youths, and a beating that left 
another youth unconscious.171 At a 2004 conference, with these rising levels of anti-
Semitism and violence, a Jewish friend asked Nobel Laureate Elie Wiesel when the Jews 
should leave Europe.172  
Along with violence stemming from traditional anti-Semitic prejudices, European 
violence against Jews has become increasingly associated with anti-Israel sentiments. 
Studies by the Community Security Trust in Great Britain have shown that attacks 
against Jews directly correspond with coverage of violence in Israel and the Middle East. 
With the beginning of the Second Intifada, attacks against Jews in the U.K. increased 
five-fold with 20 reported in September versus the 50 reported in October 2000.  Attacks 
increased in the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks and remained above 
average through October and the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan. September 2002 saw 
European governments engaged in heated debates regarding the proposed invasion of 
Iraq. With this, anti-Semitic attacks rose from 15 in August to 47 and 45 reports in 
September and October of that year. With the actual invasion of Iraq the following 
March, anti-Semitic incidents doubled within the next month. Israel’s assassination of 
Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmed in March 2004 corresponded to 100 anti-Semitic reports as 
opposed to 28 the month prior. The ICJ’s ruling on the Israeli ‘security barrier’ in June 
and July 2004 corresponded with 64 and 48 anti-Semitic reports for each month.173  
As opposed to other European nations, German criticism of Israel and anti-
Semitism have not occurred at such high levels, yet still reflect the changing opinion of 	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the public.  By 1990, Israel was ranked lower than China by the German public and its 
popularity dropped even further with the outbreak of the First Intifada.174 Traditional 
anti-Semitic motifs are still present with 50% of Germans polled believing that Jews are 
more loyal to Israel than to the German state. In the same study, 30% answered that Jews 
do not care about what happens to anyone but their own kind. Even in Germany, a 
country whose politicians have recognized the Holocaust and Nazi history as a piece of 
national identity, 58% of respondents in 2002 thought that Jews still talk about the 
Holocaust too much.175 Following this trend, a 2009 study by the Institute for 
Interdisciplinary Research on Conflict and Violence reported that 16.5% of Germans 
polled fully or partially agreed “Jews have too much influence in Germany” with another 
10.9% fully or partially agreeing “Jews are also responsible for their own persecution.”176 
 A 2009 annual report by the Stephen Roth Institute for the Study of anti-
Semitism and Racism illustrated the nature of anti-Semitism and with it anti-Israel 
sentiments throughout Germany. The institute found that in 2009, 1,520 anti-Semitic 
incidents were reported. While this data shows a slight increase in the total numbers of 
incidents reported compared to the previous year, the report found that there was a 
significant decrease in violent acts against Jews in Germany that year. There are gaps in 
this data however, as desecrations of Jewish cemeteries and Holocaust memorials, which 
occur on a near weekly basis throughout Germany, are not included in the data and are 
instead recorded as vandalism, not anti-Semitic acts.  
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A survey of 45,000 German 9th graders showed that 6.4% hold anti-Semitic views 
with 14% believing that Jews deserved the Holocaust. Along with these viewpoints, 1 out 
of 20 teenage boys belong to far-right groups. An October 2009 poll by the German 
magazine Der Spiegel reported that 13% of students attending German army academies 
in Hamburg and Munich, two leading centers of Jewish life in Germany, agree politically 
with new rightists. These new rightists believe that the elite should lead Germany and 
have serious doubts in the parliamentary system. Following these trends, “criminal anti-
Semitic acts motivated by ultra-right” political ideology increased from 1,496 to 1,520 
throughout Germany in 2009; of these, 242 occurred in Berlin, an increase from the 197 
that took place in 2008. This trend is also clear among Muslim youth who possess above 
average tendencies toward anti-Semitic prejudices. A 2007 survey by the German 
Ministry of the Interior found that 15.78% of youths with a Muslim background agreed, 
“Jews are greedy and arrogant.”177  
Following the overall European trend connecting anti-Semitism against European 
Jews with anti-Israel sentiments, Germany has reported decreases in traditional anti-
Semitism while experiencing increases in anti-Zionism. German Jews have increasingly 
reported feelings of insecurity in general, but these feelings increase during particularly 
anti-Israel moments by the German public. Scholar Yves Pallade reported that throughout 
Germany anti-Zionist ideology has become tainted with traditional anti-Semitic thinking. 
With this new perspective, anti-Zionism and the anti-Semitism found within it has 
become socially acceptable, especially in German and more broadly, European academia. 
German anti-Zionist rhetoric, similar to its European counterparts, has come to focus on 
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the nazification of Israel. These sentiments are found not only in the extreme right and 
left wing political parties but have also become common in centralist ideologies. In 2004, 
51% of Germans felt that Israel’s treatment of Palestinians was “not so different from the 
Nazi treatment of Jews during the Holocaust,” and 68% agreed, “Israel is waging a war 
of extermination against the Palestinians.” 178  With the 2008-2009 Operation Cast Lead 
in Gaza, anti-Zionist protests erupted across Germany. In Mainz, a 5,000 strong anti-
Israel protest took place with protestors carrying signs asking “Should Gaza become 
Auschwitz” and invoking the traditional anti-Semitic blood libel in stating “Israel drinks 
the blood of our children.” Counter-protesters carrying an Israeli flag were called “Jewish 
pigs” by the marchers. Police determined that the Israeli flag was provocation and 
counter-protesters were forced to remove the flag. Another anti-Israel march occurring 
only a few days earlier in Berlin featured the same sentiments with protestors chanting 
“Death to Israel” and “Kick out the Jews.” Signs at both protests featured the Star of 
David, a symbol of both Judaism and Israel, intertwined with the Nazi swastika. At a 
2009 showing of Claude Lanzmann’s film Pourquoi Israël, left-wing protestors set up 
imitation Israeli checkpoints and chanted on the injustice of the “Jewish pigs.”179 Even in 
a nation such as Germany, which typically observes extreme sensitivity in associations 
with the Nazis, public opinion linking Israel and the Third Reich has become all too 
common.  
The increase in anti-Semitism within Germany itself shows a definite change, and 
the rise in anti-Semitism is a factor that has the possibility to influence German-Israeli 
politics. Germany has sworn to “never again” allow Auschwitz to be repeated. Yet with 	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Israel and Jews now being singled out as an inheritor to Nazi violence by Europe as a 
whole, one must question how Germany will respond. 
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Conclusion 
The question is not whether a special relationship exists between Germany and 
Israel; the existing literature has firmly established that relations between the two states 
are unique. The real matter arises in questioning if the relationship will continue to be 
defined by the legacy of the Holocaust, Feldman’s “exceptionally intense history.”180 
Throughout its existence, the relationship has been singular for its basis in both “hard” 
and “soft” factors with “soft” factors often holding more influence than those based on 
strategic interests. Israel’s other special relationship with the United States formed only 
after Israel finally became a strategic asset for the United States, not an inconvenience in 
the Cold War, and has experienced severe challenges over the decades. While the 
relationship with the United States may be addressed more frequently, the special 
relationship with Germany is not only decades older, but has proven to be much less 
volatile in wavering support.  
On the Israeli side, the relationship was based more often on both “hard” and 
“soft” factors. Knowing his nation’s financial stress and limitations, Ben-Gurion 
welcomed the Reparations Agreement from a strategic viewpoint. Israel’s power from the 
“soft” influence of the Holocaust has proven instrumental in the survival of the 
relationship for what has now been nearly six decades. For Germany, the foundation of 
the relationship came from “soft” interests. With the advent of the Cold War, Germany 
had nearly regained its former strategic standing in the Western world, yet Israel was the 
only country that could begin to grant moral redemption. Thus, aside from a slight boost 
to its already recovering legitimacy, it had little to gain in “hard” factors from a 
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relationship with Israel. The memory, symbolism and psychological effect of the 
Holocaust were so great that Germany was, and has continued to be, willing to sacrifice 
its own strategic interests for the continuation of the Israeli relationship and with it, gain 
some small recovery from its crimes.  
The “soft” power of the Holocaust has continued to be the most influential aspect 
of the relationship. While Germany has occasionally wavered in its support for Israel, the 
two nations have never experienced a disagreement large enough to end the alliance. 
Germany’s relations with the Arab world collapsed in response to its weapon deal with 
Israel, yet the relationship remained. Although German scientists violated no laws by 
working for Egypt, the German government still acted to end the scientific arrangement. 
Israeli horror from the project did not come from the fact that foreign scientists were 
working for Egypt, but from the idea of German scientists working on weapons that 
could once again be used to kill Jews too soon after the Holocaust to be permissible. 
Even after Israeli agents harmed and murdered some of the scientists, the “soft” power of 
the Holocaust prevented Germany from loudly protesting Israel’s actions and instead 
quickly brought the scientists home. The influence of “soft” factors further continued in 
the established ties between the two nations. Along with traditional “hard” areas of 
cooperation that include military and economic aid, the strength of the relationship can be 
seen in the “soft” areas of collaboration between the two. This includes the youth and 
scientific exchanges that feature greatly in defining the relationship as unique. It is these 
programs that allow Israelis and Germans to understand their intense historical bond that 
surpasses strategic importance and instead places the most value on repairing relations 
between the two people.  
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From the data and studies collected examining the perceptions of each people on 
one another, it would appear that these “soft” programs have been successful in 
rationalizing and humanizing both Israelis and Germans beyond historical prejudices. Yet 
even as both people have accepted one another in a modern context, disparities remain. 
Germans, both the people and government, accept their nation’s role as the perpetrators 
of the Holocaust and with it the death and suffering of millions. Yet, the German people 
as a whole have shunned the idea of bearing personal responsibility for the Third Reich’s 
crimes. For Israelis, attempts to move beyond the Holocaust and interaction with 
Germany have been a much more difficult process. Therein lies the main difference in the 
memory and legacy of the Holocaust in both cultures. Germans have accepted their 
nation’s responsibility for the Nazi regime and its crimes, but have maintained a personal 
distance from individual responsibility of the violence. Both the German people and the 
government have spurned the idea of collective identity and with it collective guilt.  For 
Israel, the nation has taken an entirely different approach to integrating the Holocaust 
within national identity. In this case, collective identity is the basis of Israeli culture. 
Even if one’s family did not suffer directly under the German Third Reich, the Holocaust 
has become an integral part of the Israeli psyche. While Germans would prefer to leave 
their guilt in the past, both the Israeli public and government, although willing to 
appreciate Germany beyond its Nazi past, at no time in the near future will be able to 
view Germany as simply another European nation.  
With Israel holding firm to its expectations of a special relationship, it is Germany 
that has experienced the most change in the last two decades and is the most likely to 
alter the relationship’s nature. The rising levels of anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism across 
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Germany and Europe illustrate increasing displeasure with Israel that is associated with 
European Jews as well. Europe takes pride in no longer being a continent marred by near 
constant war and killings, yet mentions of the Holocaust exemplify Europe’s pained past 
that most would prefer to not mention.  Also influential is the rising trend to classify 
Israel as the heir of Nazi Germany itself. Weakening support of Israel by the German 
public appears to be directly related to the image of Israel as a genocidal occupier. This 
trend should be considered in relation to Germany’s growing use of military force. The 
most common motivation for German use of force on foreign soil is the occurrence of 
crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing or genocide. Germany, as the nation 
responsible for the Holocaust, feels that it has a moral obligation to intervene to protect 
human life and in doing so, right a small part of its troubled past. This policy is in direct 
conflict with the general opinion that Israel is in fact the nation most like the Nazi regime 
in crimes committed against the occupied Palestinian people.  If one believes that Israel’s 
policies are equal to those of Nazi Germany, than according to German policy, the nation 
would have no choice but to withdraw its support of Israel and fulfill its moral obligation 
to people suffering under occupation and ethnic cleansing, in this case, the Palestinians. 
Despite growing public displeasure, the German government has made no 
attempts to weaken the special relationship. In fact, German politicians are currently even 
more explicit in classifying the relationship as a vital piece of Germany’s foreign policy. 
For decades, German politicians argued that the establishment of formal diplomatic 
relations signaled a normalization of the relationship. Today there appears to be no 
hesitation by the German government in stating that Germany’s actions will first and 
foremost always support Israel’s sovereignty and right to exist. Even beyond foreign 
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policy, the German government is far more pronounced than the people in placing the 
Holocaust within the nation’s collective identity. Recent governments have stressed the 
necessity of accepting the Nazi era, thus allowing Germany to continue forward and once 
again embrace nationalism. While the relationship has existed between two nations, much 
more has been required of Germany and the government seems to have no interest in 
altering this. 
Currently, Israel has no motivations for bringing about an end to the special 
relationship. Israel is able to rely on Germany to have its best interests in mind while 
facing an increasingly hostile Europe. Therefore, if the relationship were to come to an 
end, it would be most logically at Germany’s will. In establishing ties and reparations 
with Israel, Germany attempted to repay its moral obligation to the Jewish people and 
regain standing in the Western world while gaining little in return strategically. For 
nearly sixty years, Germany has supported Israel’s strategic interests politically, 
economically and militarily working to right the past as much as possible. While 
arguments may be made for or against a nation’s ability to ever fully atone for genocide, 
Germany has retaken its role as a leading nation both politically and economically; its 
policies regarding military force and acceptance of the Nazi era demonstrate a clear 
attempt to accept responsibility and change ideologies. Even so, the German government 
has displayed no suggestions that it might attempt to bring about an end to the special 
relationship. With this lack of interest by the German government, it must be concluded 
that any change in policy toward Israel will be the result of public pressure on the ruling 
party. As the German public becomes more and more critical of Israel’s policies and 
increasingly unwilling to live with the guilt of their grandparents’ generation, it will be 
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the German people who demand an end to the special relationship. It should be noted 
however, that when directly confronted with the horrors of the Nazi era, German youths 
experience feelings of guilt that they must express to their Israeli counterparts. On a 
deeply internalized level, even two generations after the war, when pressed, Germans do 
feel responsibility and remorse for their forefathers’ actions.  
 In determining whether or not the relationship will continue through the 21st 
century, there is not a concise answer agreed upon by both the German public and 
government. The enormity of the Holocaust has created a relationship much stronger than 
almost all would have expected. The “soft” power resulting from this shared history 
shows no signs of weakening with both governments pledging a continuation of the 
relationship. The German government has taken the lessons of WWII and used them to 
foster and support ties to Israel as a fellow victim of the Third Reich. Because of this, if 
continued under solely governmental control, the special relationship will continue into 
the 21st century. Yet the war’s same lessons have been embraced by the German people 
as well, and with this new viewpoint, Israel has come to be viewed as an international 
pariah undeserving of the “new” Germany’s support. If public opinion continues to rise 
against Israel, the German government may have no choice but to implement substantial 
changes in the special relationship, perhaps going as far as to end the alliance with the 
backing of the German people. The strength of the relationship has always been rooted in 
the historical intensity of the Holocaust; it is only with a decrease in this intensity that the 
relationship will be changed. Even with decreased public support and increased vilifying 
of Israel, the legacy of the Holocaust could very well prove to still be strong enough to 
maintain the relationship in the eyes of the German public. 
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